Name Changes and Identity Laundering: Why Surface-Level Checks Fail

TL;DR

Name-based background checks are dangerously easy to bypass. Della’s story shows how legal identity changes can erase histories and silence safeguarding systems. It’s time for recruitment processes to stop trusting names, and start verifying identities.

What Della’s Law Reveals

From the age of six, Della was abused by a man who would go on to manipulate not just her life, but the legal system. He changed his name, repeatedly, using official channels, making it harder for victims, authorities, and future employers to track him. And he wasn’t the only one.

Until recently, there was no consistent requirement for sex offenders in the UK to report name changes in real time. The loophole meant predators could rebrand themselves legally and quietly.

Thanks to Della’s campaigning, that’s changed. The government now requires that registered offenders notify authorities of any name changes. But that law only covers a narrow slice of risk.

The deeper issue? Surface-level checks are built on sand.

Identity Laundering Is Real, and Legal

In the UK, changing your name is quick, cheap, and requires no background checks. You can do it online, by deed poll, and then update your documents, clean slate. Unless you’re under active supervision or on a specific register, there’s no safety net.

This isn’t the most common failure mode in safeguarding, but when it happens, it fails completely. Even where register checks are used, they rely on disclosure, not detection. If someone omits their previous name, or doesn’t disclose it properly, the check won’t catch it. Same for references. Same for CVs.

It’s a form of identity laundering: wiping the slate clean with a name change, and walking into the next opportunity with a blank page.

Surface-Level Checks = False Reassurance

Ask most HR teams or school administrators if they’re confident in their vetting process, and you’ll hear the same thing: “We do DBS checks. We ask for references. We follow Safer Recruitment guidance.”

But if the person in front of you has legally changed their name, and the system only checks that name - what are you really learning?

Here’s the hard truth: you can follow the rules and still miss the risk.

This isn’t about gold-plating recruitment or making processes unworkable, it’s about understanding where names stop being reliable signals.

What Safer Recruitment Really Requires

We need to stop pretending names are enough. A name is not an identity; it’s a label, and one that can be changed. To be clear: DBS checks, references, and formal guidance still matter - they’re just no longer sufficient on their own.

Safer recruitment needs to lean in to multi-layer identity verification:

• Birth certificates (not just passports)
• Known aliases and name history
• Date of birth matching and identity triangulation
• Behavioural and digital indicators that surface hidden patterns
• Tech that assumes manipulation is possible, and checks anyway

This isn’t about creating fear. It’s about creating resilience. Because predators adapt. Systems must, too.

If It Helps Just One Organisation…

Della’s story is raw. And it’s real. It shouldn’t take a survivor-led campaign to close every loophole. But while policy slowly catches up, organisations have decisions to make today.

Are we checking identities, or just names?

Are we protecting the people in our care, or trusting a system that’s already been exploited?

This isn’t about tech. It’s about trust.

Call to Action:

• For organisations: Audit your process. Would it have caught Della’s perpetrator?
• For policymakers: Close the remaining gaps. Name change oversight must be systemic, not case-by-case.
• For everyone in safeguarding: Share this. Challenge the defaults. Ask more than references. Scan more than CVs. Look deeper than names.

Let’s go. 🚀